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DISPUTING THE DISPUTE PROCESS: QUESTIONING THE

FAIRNESS OF § 1681 s-2(A)(8) AND § 168 1J(A)(1)(A) OF THE
FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT REPORTING ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
"We certainly would not tolerate a Government agency depriving a
citizen of his livelihood orfreedom on the basis of unsubstantiated
gossip without an opportunity to present his case. And yet this is
entirelypossible on the part ofa credit reporting agency."I

"He [who] has lost his credit is dead to the world." 2 For millions
of Americans, the consumer credit report functions as a gate-keeper to
the economic landscape of the twenty-first century. 3 This is largely
due to the fact that data collection and storage has become feasible on
a large scale,4 which has led the credit report, a snapshot of an
individual based on aggregated financial data, to become intertwined
with the personal identities of millions of Americans.5 "An adverse
credit report can impact life in ways not readily imaginable," 6 and has
been likened to a modem Scarlet Letter.7 Credit reports are no longer
used only to determine the interest rate of a consumer's loan or credit
1. 115 CONG. REC. 2412 (1969) (statement of Sen. Proxmire). Senator
Proxmire introduced the Fair Credit Reporting Act as a "bill to enable consumers to
protect themselves against arbitrary, erroneous, and malicious credit information."
Id. at 2410.
2. JOHN R. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 445 (3d ed. 1986)
(quoting GEORGE HERBERT, JACULA PRUDENTUM (1640)).

3. See Elizabeth Doyle O'Brien, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved
Scarlet Letter: An Urgent Call to Amend fl681E(B) of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 1217, 1217-18 (2008). "In 2001, seventy-five percent of
households in the United States held some type of debt ..... Id. at 1217.
4. See Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing
and Old-FashionedDefamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1061, 1100 (2007).
5. See id.
6. D. Duff Mckee, Liability for Supplying False Information to Credit
Reporting Agency, 45 AM JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3d § 1, at 221 (2010).
7. O'Brien, supra note 3, at 1218.
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card. Today, insurance companies, landlords, utility providers, and
employers look to credit reports when making pivotal decisions
regarding consumers or future employees. 9
However, what happens when an adverse mark is erroneously
placed on a consumer's credit report? Congress has mandated that
Credit Reporting Agencies ("CRAs") conduct a "reasonable
investigation" if a consumer disputes the accuracy of any item in the
credit report directly to a CRA.10 And, on July 1, 2010, a Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") regulation became effective requiring any
person or entity that furnishes consumer credit information
("furnishers") to reasonably investigate inaccuracies in a consumer's
credit report if the consumer directly disputes the accuracy of the
information with the furnisher."
Nonetheless, the processes for handling disputes are insufficient
to ensure an accurate credit reporting system. When a CRA receives a
consumer dispute, it outsources the dispute to a third-party contractor
in Costa Rica or the Philippines, where a minimum of twenty-two
disputes are processed every hour. 12 CRAs have also managed to
reduce the cost of processing dispute letters, which often contain more
than one dispute, to fifty cents. 13 Further, a furnisher is only liable to a
consumer for failure to conduct a reasonable investigation if the
furnisher receives the dispute from the CRA, rather than directly from
the consumer. 14 Compounding the problem of an insufficient dispute
8. Who's Looking at Your Credit Report?, SMART MONEY (Aug. 20, 2010),
http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/guess-whos-looking-at-your-creditreport- 11056 [hereinafter Who's Looking]; Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a
Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers Seeking to Fix Errors in Their
Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 139 (2010).
9. Who's Looking, supra note 8; Wu, supra note 8, at 139.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2006).
11. 16 C.F.R. § 660.4 (2010) (enacted pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(a)(8)(A)).
12. Anne Kadet, Why the Credit Bureaus Can't Get it Right, SMART MONEY
(Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/why-the-creditbureaus-cannot-get-it-right/?page=all.
13. Id.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (2003). When a consumer disputes information
directly to a furnisher, the FTC, chief law enforcement officer of a state, or an
agency designated by the state, can bring an action against the furnisher and recover
"damages of not more than $1,000 for each willful or negligent violation." Id.; see

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol47/iss2/10

2

Guerrero: Disputing the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of § 1681

2011]

DISPUTING THE DISPUTE PROCESS

439

process, credit reports are generally only available to consumers-to
check for inaccuracies-once a year free of charge.' 5
Consumers are left without a voice. One need not look far to find
"horror stories" of consumers' fruitless attempts to correct information
within their credit reports.' 6 For example, Kenneth Baker, a husband
and father, was unable to qualify for a mortgage due to inaccuracies
within his credit report." After a year of unsuccessful attempts to
correct the inaccuracies, he felt humiliated, became depressed, and
soon-after committed suicide.' 8 His suicide note referenced his
difficulties with the CRAs.19
Under current credit reporting legislation and regulation,
consumers are provided few remedies for experienced wrongs. This
apparent lack of redress is due to the current credit reporting system's
failure to provide a framework of incentives and penalties to motivate
CRAs and furnishers to adequately address disputes, or, more
generally, to ensure the accuracy of consumer credit information. This
Comment proposes that Congress establish such a framework by
striking § 1681s-2(a)(8) and amending § 1681j(a)(1)(A) of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA").
The remainder of this Comment is divided into five sections.
Section II provides an overview of the credit reporting industry, and
Section III explores the prevalence of inaccuracies found within the
industry. Section IV analyzes the current dispute process, including
the consumer's ability to access his or her own credit information.
Section V analyzes the economic motivations that drive the credit
reporting industry. Finally, Section VI proposes a framework of

also Rollins v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 379 F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (N.D. Ill.
2005). ("It is undisputed that there is no private right of action under § 168 1s-2(a).")
Section 1681s-2(a) mandates that the FTC create regulations for furnishers requiring
an investigation of customer initiated disputes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a). "The FCRA
limits enforcement of subsection (a) of § 1681s-2 governing supplying accurate
information exclusively to certain federal and/or state officers." Carney v. Experian
Information Solutions, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496, 502 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
15. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions of Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
sec. 211, § 612, 117 Stat. 1952, 1968-69 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A)).
16. See Wu, supra note 8, at 140-41.
17. Id. at 140.
18. Id. at 141.
19. Id.
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incentives and punishments that strikes § 1681 s-2(a)(8) and amends §
168 1j(a)(1)(A) of the FCRA.

II.

THE CREDIT REPORTING INDUSTRY

"There is no argument with the proposition that both consumers
and industry need an efficient and accurate credit reporting
system. '"20

"[T]he United States has the most robust credit information
system in the world." 2 1 The credit reporting industry has become a
seven billion dollar industry22 by collecting and aggregating data
about
consumers
to
create
credit
reports-commercial
"representation[s] of... [consumers'] reputation[s]." 23 A credit report
is a record showing a consumer's debt, and borrowing and repayment
habits.2 4 This information is tied to individual consumers through
identifying information, including social security numbers, birthdates,
and addresses. 25 Credit reports also identify the entities that furnished
the information by including their addresses and telephone numbers.2 6
All of this information is compiled by, and housed within, the three
major national CRAs: Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion. 27 Experian
alone maintains records on 215 million American consumers. 28 CRAs
receive information from more than 30,000 furnishers who report
information on approximately four billion transactions every month.29
20. FONSECA, supra note 2, at 449 (quoting U.S. S. Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions of the Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 1 (1970) (statement
of Sen. Proxmire)).
21. O'Brien, supra note 3, at 1220.
22. Kadet, supra note 12.
23. De Armond, supra note 4, at 1068.
24. Wu, supra note 8, at 141.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Your Rights: Credit Reporting, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/menus/consumer/credit/rights.shtm (last modified Mar. 13, 2009).
28. De Armond, supra note 4, at 1073.
29. FED. TRADE COMM'N & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE PROCESS 3

(2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/fcradispute/P044808fcra
sdisputeprocessreporttocongress.pdf [hereinafter DISPUTE PROCESS REPORT].
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A consumer's credit report reflects this information within seven days

of receipt. 30
A growing number of industries are relying on credit reports to
screen consumers; these industries include insurance companies,
landlords, utility providers, and employers. 3 ' Nonetheless, the primary
purpose of the credit report is to facilitate businesses' needs to plan for
and minimize risk-to determine whether a consumer is

creditworthy. 32 Businesses use the credit report as a tool that allows
them to "pierce the fog of uncertainty that a potential .. . [debtor]
presents." 33 When extending credit to consumers, businesses utilize
risk models, which are created using credit reports, advanced
marketing software, and data mining. 34 These risk models are used to
establish the creditworthiness of borrowers so businesses can
determine (1) whether to extend credit, and (2) at what interest rate the
credit should be extended. 35 As the costs of collecting, storing, and
analyzing credit-relevant data continue to decrease, it has become
feasible for businesses to move toward a risk-based pricing on credit
that sorts borrowers and establishes costs based on the probability that
the consumer will default.36 Businesses rely on credit reports to plan
for and minimize risk, which requires an accurate understanding of
their potential customers.3 7 This understanding is established through
the use of the credit reports compiled by CRAs. 38
The consumer credit information found within a credit report
often originates with the same business entities that use the
information to extend credit to consumers: i.e., the furnishers are often
the creditors of the consumer. 3 9 These businesses track the
30. Id.
31. Who's Looking, supra note 8.
32. See O'Brien, supranote 3, at 1218.

33. Id. at 1221.
34. Erika F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
FinancialRegulation to Risk Models and the Global FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L.

REv. 127, 144 (2009).
35. Id.
36. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem ofPredatoryLending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707, 720-21 (2006).
37. See O'Brien, supra note 3, at 1217-22.
38. See id.
39. See Fair Credit Reporting Act: How it Functionsfor Consumers and the
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performance of an account and note any on-time payments or
delinquencies that a consumer might have had. 40 This information is
recorded in a universal data format designed and adopted by the
CRAs, Metro 2.41 Metro 2 reduces the consumer credit report and
history to a numerical format that is understood and analyzed by the
CRAs.4 2 In turn, every month these businesses furnish, or "dump," the
information to the CRAs.4 3 This information is maintained and stored
by the CRAs and is eventually sold, shared, or given as part of a free
credit report to businesses and consumers.4
This information is reported by furnishers to CRAs on a voluntary
basis.4 5 However, once a business has shared such information with a
CRA, it is deemed to be a "furnisher" of consumer credit information
and is subject to administrative enforcement (and in some cases civil
liability) under the FCRA.4 6 Furnishers participate in this voluntary
system because it incentivizes consumers to pay back debts
(consumers can avoid receiving an adverse mark on their report), and
it can also be an advertising tool for the subprime market. 47 For
Economy; Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 13 (2007)
(written testimony of Leonard A. Bennett, National Association of Consumer
Advocates), available at http://www.naca.net/assets/shared/633201869867878750.
pdf
40. See id.
41. CHI CHI WU & ELIZBETH DE ARMOND, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR
CREDIT REPORTING 177-79 (6th ed. 2006); Metro 2 Information, CONSUMER DATA
INDUSTRY Ass'N, http://www.cdiaonline.org/Metro2/content.cfm?ItemNumber-854

(last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
42. See Metro 2 Format: Base Segment, COLLECT!, http://www.collect.org/
Help/metro2formatbasesegment.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2011), for an example of
the Metro 2 format.
43. WU & DE ARMOND, supranote 41, at 177-79.
44. FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC FACTS FOR CONSUMERS: YOUR ACCESS TO
FREE CREDIT REPORTS 1 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/
pubs/consumer/credit/cre34.pdf [hereinafter FTC FACTS].
45. Interagency Guidelines Concerning the Accuracy and Integrity of
Information Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies, 12 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. E
(2010).
46. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681s-2 (2003). "[A] private cause of action exists for
consumers against furnishers of credit information for failing to follow proper
reinvestigation procedures, under § 168 1s-2(b)." Cisneros v. Trans Union, LLC, 293
F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (D. Haw. 2003).
47. Bennett, supra note 39, at 13. Mr. Bennett's practice is devoted to the
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example, companies may state they will help the consumer rebuild
their credit. However, the main incentive to participate stems from the
wide-scale reliance on credit reports. 48 Furnishers are often the same
entities looking to credit reports when making business decisions, and
the system only works when everyone participates. 49 If some
companies did not furnish information, then the integrity of the entire
credit reporting industry would be adversely affected.
The credit reporting industry consists of three parties: the
consumer, the furnisher, and the CRA. The consumer initiates and
maintains debtor-creditor relationships with furnishers. The furnishers
report the happenings of these relationships to the CRAs. The CRAs
collect, aggregate, and analyze data received from furnishers. The
CRAs profit from this data by selling it to creditors, employers,
insurers, and even consumers.o

III.

PREVALENCE OF INACCURACIES

"Perhapsthe most seriousproblem in the credit reportinf industry
is the problem of inaccurateor misleading information."5

Introducing the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1969, Senator
Proxmire made it clear that even a nominal percentage of inaccuracies
within the credit reporting industry would pose substantial risks 52
There have been no definitive studies made ofjust how accurate . .
the information in the files of [the CRAs is]. But even if it is 99
percent accurate . .. the 1 percent inaccuracy represents over a
million people. While the industry might be satisfied with a 1percent error, this is small comfort to the 1 million citizens whose
reputations are unjustly maligned. Moreover the composition of the
1 million persons is constantly shifting. Everyone is a potential

private enforcement of the FCRA and has "lost only four FCRA cases out of
hundreds prosecuted." Id. at 2.
48. See O'Brien,supra note 3, at 1218.
49. Id.
50. DIsPuTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 3; see also Bennett, supra
note 39, at 5.
51. 115 CONG. REc. 2411 (1969) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
52. Id.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

7

California Western Law Review, Vol. 47 [2010], No. 2, Art. 10

444

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

victim of an inaccurate credit report. If not today, then perhaps
tomorrow. 53
A good credit report can open the doors to a consumer's new
home or car.5 4 It also has a bearing on the consumer's ability to obtain
credit and insurance at a fair price. However, a bad credit report can
quash many of these opportunities or make them much more
expensive. 56 Despite the significance of the information within credit
reports, "errors are unfortunately quite common in the credit reporting
system."57 An error in a consumer's credit report can have significant
consequences and bring undue hardship to the consumer.5 8 On a
macro level, inaccuracies within the credit reporting system are
generally detrimental to the economy.59 Businesses rely on credit
reports as a predictor of a consumer's credit behavior, and to
determine whether a consumer poses an acceptable risk.60 When the
data relied upon is inaccurate, the credit report "become[s] a far less
effective predictor of future credit behavior."6 '
Because of the magnitude of the credit reporting industry, 62 it is
impossible to have an accurate snapshot of its health. Nonetheless,
continuous legislation and regulation are not axiomatic of a healthy
53. Id.
54. Wu, supra note 8, at 139.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 143.
58. Id. at 139-41. For a plethora of anecdotal evidence on the adverse effects
an inaccurate credit report can bring to a consumer, see id. at 144. Consumers who
have been misrepresented and denied credit because of inaccuracies often partake in
fruitless fights against CRAs, because CRAs have been known to vigorously defend
lawsuits brought by individual consumers. Id. at 148. These inaccuracies have led
consumers to be denied student loans, to be penalized with higher credit card interest
rates, and even to be denied credit. Id. Frustrated by this alienation, consumers have
described having breakdowns and have even committed suicide. Id.
59. See Bennett, supra note 39, at 4; see also De Armond, supra note 4, at
1091.
60. See Bennett, supra note 39, at 4; see also De Armond, supra note 4, at
1091.
61. Bennett, supra note 39, at 4.
62. CRAs process approximately four billion transactions a month. DiSPuTE
PROCEss REPORT, supra note 29, at 3.
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system. Further, there are many indications that the credit reporting
industry is not in peak condition. In 2002, a review of 500,000
consumer reports revealed "29% of consumers had variances of 50
points or more in their credit scores derived from credit reports from
each of the three major [CRAs]."63 These numbers lead to the
conservative inference that at least eight million Americans are put at
risk for being mistakenly identified as a subprime applicant, placing
them in a position to pay more for credit. 64 Another study conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors reviewed 248,000 credit
reports and found "70% of consumers had at least one trade line
account with incomplete information." 65
Further, in 2004 the U.S. Public Interest Research Group
conducted a survey of adults in thirty states and found "25% of the
credit reports surveyed contained serious errors that could result in
the denial of credit." 66 These serious errors include accounts
incorrectly marked as delinquent or being in collections, accounts
attributed to a consumer that do not belong to him or her, and
bankruptcies, tax liens or other judgments that are not attributable to
the consumer. 67 Of all the credit reports surveyed, 79% had errors or
mistakes of some kind.68 Even the trade association for the CRAs, the
63. ALISON CASSADY & EDMUND MIERZWINSKi, NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE
PIRGs, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS

6 (2004), available at cdn.publicinterestnetwork.org/assets/BEevuv19a3KzsATR
bZMZlw/MistakesDoHappen2004.pdf (noting the results of a report conducted by
the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and the National Consumer Reporting
Association, a "group of small independent credit bureaus").
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13. Some of the errors included (1) listing a 28-year-old lawyer's
current employment as the job she held during high school, (2) listing "a consumer's
business partner as his spouse" despite the consumer being widowed for twenty
years, and (3) listing a student loan as open despite being paid several years before.
Id. at 12. Other common errors included inaccurate personal information, loans
being listed multiple times, closed accounts being listed as open, and missing
accounts. Id.
68. Wu, supra note 8, at 144 (citing DISPUTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29,
at 12).
68. FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTIONS 318 AND
319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 2 (2004),
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Consumer Data Industry Association (CDIA), has reported that 21.8%
of consumers who order their credit report file a dispute. 69 The FTC is
currently conducting "an ongoing study of the accuracy and
completeness of information contained in consumer reports prepared
or maintained by CRAs and methods for improving the accuracy and
completeness of such information." 70 This eleven-year study is
required by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
("FACT Act") and will be finalized and reported to Congress in
2014.
Through the compilation of credit reports, the credit reporting
industry creates the commercial identities of millions of American
consumers.72 CRAs owe a duty to consumers to represent them as
accurately as possible. This duty includes addressing discrepancies.
CRAs also owe a duty to customers who use the information prior to
extending credit to consumers. The creditors rely on this information
as a predictor of a consumer's credit behavior. 73 Further, CRAs owe a
duty to furnishers. When the CRA displays inaccurate information
about a consumer in the credit report, the consumer may believe the
creditor and furnisher are inaccurately reporting the information, thus
adversely affecting the debtor-creditor relationship. By failing to
maintain accurate records, CRAs not only do a disservice to
consumers, but to the economy in general.7 4 An examination of the
process for disputing inaccuracies will lead to a better understanding
of why inaccuracies still persist throughout the industry.
IV. THE DISPUTE PROCESS
"It would be unrealistic to expect credit reporting agencies to be
absolutely correct on every single case. But it seems .. . that
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf [hereinafter FED.
TRADE REPORT] (quoting Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat 1952, 1999 (2003)).
69. Wu, supra note 8, at 144 (referring to DISPUTE PROCESS REPORT, supra
note 29).

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

FED. TRADE REPORT,

supra note 68.

Id.
De Armond, supra note 4, at 1068.
Bennett, supra note 39, at 4.
Id.
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consumers affected by an adverse rating do have a right to present
their side of the story and to have inaccurate information expunged
from theirfile. "

In the 1960s, "the executive branch proposed the establishment of
a national data bank with personal information on every U.S.
citizen."7 6 This idea was quickly abandoned due to privacy concerns.
Nonetheless, a private credit reporting industry arose.78 Noticing
"[credit reporting] system[s] [had] been built up with virtually no
public regulation or supervision," 79 Congress passed the FCRA in
1970.80 "[The] objective [of the] fair credit reporting [act was] ... to
insure that the credit information system [would be] responsive to the
needs of consumers as well as creditors."81
With the inception of the FCRA, Congress knew and understood
that a perfectly accurate credit reporting system would not be
feasible.8 2 Tellingly, "[t]he legislative history ... characterizes the
dispute and correction process as the heart of . .. efforts to ensure the

ultimate accuracy of the consumer report." 83 The dispute process is a
safeguard that ensures credit reports portray the most accurate
information possible. 84 Because inaccuracies will be present within
the credit industry, it is essential to have an expedited dispute process
that allows consumers to clear their name of any undeserved, adverse
marks. It is also essential that the credit reporting industry is
transparent, allowing consumers to track inaccuracies.

75. 115 CONG. REc. 2412 (1969) (Senator Proxmire introducing the FCRA).
76. Id. at 2411.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2410.
80. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1681-1681x).
81. 115 CONG. REc. 2411 (1969) (providing Senator Proxmire's explanation
of the need for a fair credit reporting bill).
82. See id. at 2412; Bennett, supra note 39, at 18.
83. Bennett, supra note 39, at 18 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
84. Id.
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A. The Logistics
The FCRA requires that CRAs, free of charge, conduct a
"reasonable reinvestigation" of information disputed by consumers.8 5
After a consumer disputes information, the CRA must provide the
furnisher "all relevant information regarding the dispute" within five
business days.8 6 This reinvestigation must be finalized by the CRAs
no later than thirty days after the consumer sends the dispute.87 And,
no later than five days after the reinvestigation is conducted the CRA
must give written notice of outcome to the consumer.8 8 This
requirement has generally been enforced by the FTC.89 However, with
the passing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 90 a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection will be
tasked with enforcing the FCRA jointly with the FTC.9 1 The Bureau is
also given rulemaking authority for "federal consumer financial
law." 92
Under the FCRA, a private cause of action is only available for
willful 93 or negligent noncompliance. 94 However, proving actual
damages may be difficult because a consumer would have to show
that, but for the inaccuracy in the credit report, the consumer would
have received a lower interest rate or would not have been denied
credit. 95 Still, some courts have allowed emotional distress and
humiliation to be included in recovery for actual damages. 96
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i (2003).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2003).
90. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
91. Id. § 1015, 124 Stat. at 1974.
92. Id. § 1022, 124 Stat. at 1980.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 168in (2003). This law creates statutory damages of not less
than $100 and not more than $1,000, and punitive damages if the court allows. Id.
CRAs have been held liable for not complying with a consumer's request for a
reinvestigation. See Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich.
1976).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (2003).
95. See Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th
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The reasonableness of the CRAs' reinvestigation procedures is
often called into question. 97 The current dispute process has turned
into "an automated and perfunctory process that is a mockery of how a
real dispute process should function." 98 As one commentator has
remarked, "All important components of the credit reporting system
are automated. What human involvement remains is solely that of data
entry, much of it accomplished overseas." 99 This is in part due to the
economic motivations driving the credit industry, which are discussed
below in Section V. Perhaps exasperating this situation, CRAs created
a web-based application known as the Online Solution for Complete
and Accurate Reporting ("e-OSCAR") to handle disputes.o CRAs
and furnishers utilize e-OSCAR to create and respond to credit
information disputed by the consumer.101 The CDIA claims that over
83% of all disputes are processed via e-OSCAR.' 0 2
The e-OSCAR application boils disputes down to two-digit
codes' 03 that represent one of twenty-six predefined categories. 104 The
problem with automating the dispute process and "boiling a dispute
down"105 to a numerical code is that disputes are sent without
supporting documents such as billing or payoff statements. 0 6 CRAs
Cir. 1995).
96. Id.; Saenz v. Trans Union, LLC, 621 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1085 (D. Or.
2007).
97. Wu, supra note 8, at 155. CRAs should build some form of qualitative
oversight into their automated system. One court has held that the automated system
may not be sufficient: "By relying on its automated system .

. ,

Experian could be

found by a reasonable juror to have been reckless." Campbell v. Experian Info.
Solutions, Inc., No. 08-4217-CV-C-NKL, 2009 WL 3834125, at *9 (W.D. Mo.
2009).
98. Wu, supra note 8, at 156.
99. Bennett, supra note 39, at 3.
100. See About e-OSCAR, E-OSCAR, http://www.e-oscar.org/about (last
visited Mar. 17, 2011).
10 1. Id.
102.

DisPuTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.

103. Bob Tedeschi, FaultingCredit Firms on Fixing Errors,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
6, 2009, at RE6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/08/realestate/
08mort.html?r- 1.
104.

DISPUTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.

105. Tedeschi, supra note 103.
106. Wu, supra note 8, at 158.
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claim that because sending the relevant documentation would be
difficult, they have created a comment box within e-OSCAR, which
allows individuals submitting disputes to enter a textual explanation of
the dispute.10 7 This box is called the "FCRA Relevant Information
field" and is limited to a single line of text with a limited character
count.' An employee from TransUnion testified that the FCRA
Relevant Information Field is used in less than 10% of all disputes.' 09
In addition to their automation, disputes are often handled overseas,
where quotas must be met, requiring up to twenty-two disputes to be
processed per hour.1 10
Consumers who are lucky enough to be on the CRAs "VIP List,"
however, need not worry themselves with the e-OSCAR debacle."'
These complaints receive "priority processing" or "additional
processing procedures."" 2 Many of the individuals on the CRAs'
"VIP List" will receive a dedicated representative or high level
employee to personally handle their dispute.1 1 3 While the majority of
disputes are handled overseas in the Philippines or Costa Rica in a
highly automated manner, VIPs need not worry because they will
have their dispute handled domestically by a dedicated
representative.1 14 What does it take to find oneself on the CRAs' "VIP
List?" If an individual is a "judge, senator, congressman, government
official, attorney, paralegal, professional athlete, actor, director,
member of the media or a celebrity," they are likely to get preferential
treatment from a CRA when disputing inaccuracies.' 15 CRA
employees also receive this preferential treatment.1 16
The CRAs' automated process for handling disputes raises serious
questions of reasonableness. Moreover, it seems even CRAs are aware
107. Id. at 175. One commentator argues that it would not be difficult for the
CRAs to submit a scanned, electronic copy of the documents. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 181; see also Kadet, supra note 12.
111. Wu, supranote 8, at 184; Kadet, supra note 12.
112. Kadet, supra note 12.
113. Id.; Bennett, supra note 39, at 5.
114. Kadet, supra note 12; Bennett, supra note 39, at 6.
115. See Kadet, supra note 12; Bennett, supra note 39, at 5; see also Wu,
supra note 8, at 184-85.
116. Wu, supra note 8, at 185.
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of these questions, as they've created a "VIP List" for individuals who
seem to be in positions to expose the automated process, bring suit for
violations of the FCRA, or seek legislative reform. 1 7
B. Transparency
Understandably, consumers will not file a dispute unless they are
aware of inaccuracies in their credit report. Because consumers have
no say in determining whether their data is included in a credit report,
at the very least they should have free access to this information.H8
Noting these concerns, Congress, in 2003, amended the FCRA by
passing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA")1 19
"to prevent identity theft, improve resolution of consumer disputes,
improve the accuracy of consumer records, [and] make improvements
in the use of, and consumer access to, credit information." 120
Prior to FACTA, consumers could only receive their credit report
free of charge once every twelve months under limited
circumstances.12 1 FACTA expanded consumers' right to receive a free
copy of their credit report every twelve months. 122 Pursuant to
FACTA, the "big three" nationwide consumer credit reporting
agencies-Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion-have created a
centralized location (www.annualcreditreport.com) for consumers to
request a free annual copy of their credit report. 123 Consumers are also
able to receive a free copy of their credit report after receiving
"adverse notice"; i.e., after being denied credit.124 If a consumer
wishes to receive a copy of his or her credit report under any other

117. Kadet, supra note 12; Bennett, supra note 39, at 5; see also Wu, supra
note 8, at 184-85.
118. Wu,supranote8,at 181.
119. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
117 Stat. 1952.
120. Id.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1997), amended by 15. U.S.C. § 1681j (2006).
122. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions of Act of 2003, sec. 211, § 612,
117 Stat. at 1969 (codified at 15. U.S.C. 168 1j) .
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(B) (2003); About Us, ANNUALCREDIT
REPORT.COM, https://www.annualcreditreport.com/cra/helpabout (last visited Nov.
30, 2010).
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (2006).
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circumstances, he or she must pay a "fair and reasonable fee" that is
determined by the FTC. 125 Further, as discussed below in Section V,
CRAs have created an industry out of credit monitoring. CRAs market
products to consumers that give them the ability to track the
information in their credit report at any point in time.126
Giving consumers a glimpse of their commercial identity once a
year hardly seems sufficient. This insufficiency becomes particularly
glaring when one considers the prevalence of inaccuracies and the fact
that CRAs have mechanisms in place that can easily allow consumers
to track this information. 12 7 In order for consumers to dispute
inaccuracies in their credit reports, they must first be aware of them.
Having access to a free credit report once a year does not offer
consumers the ability to have an accurate perception of their
commercial identity.
V. AN EXAMINATION OF MOTIVATIONS
"[T]he core problem.. . is that few market incentives exist to
motivate the credit [reporting] industry to voluntarily correct
accuracyproblems . . . ."128

"The present credit reporting system is broken."1 29 Numerous
reports continue to show the credit reporting system is plagued by
inaccuracies. 130 Even the industry trade group has admitted to

125. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g (2006).
126. See, e.g., FREECREDITREPORT.COM, http://www.freecreditreport.com (last
visited Nov. 30, 2010); FTC FACTS, supra note 44, at 1-2. Freecreditreport.com is
not authorized to fill orders for the free annual credit report consumers are entitled to
under the FCRA. Id. The FTC refers to sites like freecreditreport.com, which is
owned by Experian, as "imposter sites." FTC FACTS, supra note 44, at 2.
127. See FREECREDITREPORT.COM, supra note 126. Credit monitoring services
are offered to consumers at $14.95 a month and enrollment is automatic after a "trial
period." Id.
128. Wu & DE ARMOND, supra note 41, at 17 (citing Fair Credit Reporting
Act: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs and Coinage of the Comm.
on Banking, Finance,and UrbanAffairs Before the H.R., 102d Cong. 214 (statement
of Dr. Mary Culnan)).
129. Bennett, supra note 39, at 3.
130. Id.; see also CASSADY & MIERZWINSKI, supra note 63, at 6.
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substantial inaccuracies within the industry. 13 ' Despite the fact that
such problems lead to a poor public perception of the industry, CRAs
have not been overly proactive in addressing accuracy issues. In fact,
the industry continues to argue for a more lax standard for the
handling of consumer disputes. 132 An examination of the credit
industry's motivations is needed to explain this inaction.
When faced with liability, CRAs claim it is impossible to control
the accuracy of the more than 3.5 billion pieces of account
information they receive every month.133 CRAs continually argue
"that creditors are better situated [than CRAs] to determine the
accuracy of information."' 34 Following this reasoning, CRAs rely on
the "general rule of garbage-in-garbage-out": if inaccurate information
about a consumer is furnished to a CRA, inaccurate information will
be reported in that consumer's credit report.13 5 Experian's director of
public education has even stated, "We're the library ...

. We don't

36

write the book." CRAs continually defer liability by claiming they
are not in the best position to ensure the accuracy of the products they
sell.
According to an industry expert, "[T]he core problem .. . is that
few market incentives exist to motivate the credit [reporting] industry
to voluntarily correct accuracy problems because consumers are not
the agencies' paying customers." 137 The creditors who either furnish
or use the information aggregated by the CRAs are the primary
customers.138 Individual entities have been found to pay CRAs

131. Wu, supra note 8, at 144.
132. See Wu, supra note 8, at 172 (citing cases where the court has rejected
arguments by CRAs claiming that the furnishers are in the best position to determine
the accuracy of disputed information).
133. Kadet, supra note 12.
134. Wu, supra note 8, at 172.
135. De Armond, supra note 4, at 1096; Kadet, supra note 12.
136. Kadet, supra note 12 (claiming if furnishers give inaccurate information
to CRAs, the CRAs produce an inaccurate credit report).
137. WU & DE ARMOND, supra note 41, at 17 (citing Fair Credit Reporting
Act: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on ConsumerAffairs and Coinage of the Comm.
on Banking, Finance,and UrbanAffairs Before the H.R., 102d Cong. 214 (statement
of Dr. Mary Culnan)).
138. Wu, supra note 8, at 180.
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millions of dollars each year.' 3 9 Creditors therefore have the ability to
choose which CRA they will purchase information from.140 An entity
functioning as both creditor and furnisher is less likely to work with a
CRA that demands intensive review of consumer disputes.14' Rather
than spend time on resolving disputes, furnishers and CRAs benefit
from an expedited dispute process.14 2
Driven by market incentives to create an expedited dispute
process, CRAs created the e-OSCAR system, mentioned above in
Section IV. 143 CRAs and furnishers utilize e-OSCAR to create and
respond to credit information that is disputed by the consumer.144 The
CDIA claims that over 83% of all disputes are processed via eOSCAR.145 Furnishers that do not utilize e-OSCAR submit paper
disputes via mail or fax to the CRAs.14 6 CRAs, however, have
announced they plan to require all disputes to be processed via eOSCAR.147 The CRAs may be requiring all furnishers to utilize eOSCAR because e-OSCAR produces revenue for the CRAs; they
charge furnishers $0.30 for each dispute sent to the furnisher via eOSCAR.148 "[T]he more automated disputes [e-OSCAR] sends out,
the more money it generates."' 49 In 2005, e-OSCAR was moved from
the non-profit CRA lobbyist group, CDIA, to a for-profit company,
Online Data Exchange, L.L.C.1 5 0
Because CRAs can create revenue by sending disputes to
furnishers through e-OSCAR, CRAs have incentive to reduce the cost
of consumer dispute resolution to increase revenue."s Instead of

139. Id.
140. Id. at 181.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. About e-OSCAR, supra note 100.
144. Id.
145. DisPUTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 15.
146. Id. at 15-16.
147. Id.
148. e-OSCAR Costs, E-OSCAR, http://www.e-oscar.org/costs.htm
visited Nov. 30, 2010).
149. Bennett, supra note 39, at 4.
150. Id.
151. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol47/iss2/10

(last

18

Guerrero: Disputing the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of § 1681

2011]1

DISPUTING THE DISPUTE PROCESS

455

investing efforts to create solutions to deal with inaccuracies, CRAs
have reduced the amount of resources they use to investigate
consumer disputes. 152 For example, Equifax used to spend $4.67 to
process each dispute letter. Recently, they outsourced this process to
the Philippines, where dispute letters, often containing many disputed
items, can be processed for $0.57 each. 153 An Equifax employee
estimated that Philippine workers were only allowed to spend four
minutes on each dispute, and a TransUnion manager stated that
"workers are expected to complete up to 22 cases an hour." 54
As stated above, furnishers pay $0.30 to handle each disputed
item. 155 So, by reducing the cost of processing dispute letters, CRAs
can actually see a profit from the dispute process "by charging
furnishers for investigations [of each disputed item]." 56 "[T]he more
automated disputes [e-OSCAR] sends out, the more money it
generates."' 57 Because CRAs can profit from inaccuracies, they are
presented little economic incentive to proactively address accuracy
issues. Paired with the fact that consumers are not the paying
customers, this lack of incentive underscores why CRAs are reluctant
to proactively deal with accuracy issues and consumer disputes. The
resulting situation may help to illustrate why consumers have had such
difficulty correcting inaccuracies on their report with the CRAs.
On the other hand, as a practical matter, furnishers have an
incentive to address consumer credit disputes because of the ongoing
business relationship they often share with consumers. While CRAs
have a fairly discrete relationship with consumers, they do not offer
significant services to consumers and have little incentive in
correcting a consumer's credit report; furnishers have a relationship
with their consumers and want to keep their customers happy.
There is yet another way CRAs profit from inaccuracies in credit
reports. CRAs have created and marketed products that allow
152. Id.
153. Wu, supra note 8, at 183. Not all disputes are handled this way. CRAs
maintain a list of "VIPs" including attorneys, politicians, and celebrities. VIP
disputes are handled by high-level employees located within the United States. Id. at
185.
154. Kadet, supra note 12.
155. e-OSCAR Costs, supra note 148.
156. Wu, supra note 8, at 184.
157. Id.
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consumers to monitor their credit. 5 8 These products are marketed to
consumers through statements such as, "Make sure your reports are
accurate & free of fraud."' 5 9 These products present "almost zero
marginal cost to the [CRAs], yet they sell [them to consumers] for
$150 a year or more."1 60 By selling these products to consumers,
CRAs are deferring their duty to maintain accurate information to
paying consumers. As one commentator has noted, "[C]onsumers are
faced with what can fairly be described as credit extortion. Consumers
are told to buy the CRA products or else remain in fear that they will
be inaccurate and full of fraud." 1 61
These services allow CRAs to profit on two fronts: from the
consumer and from the furnisher. CRAs see a profit from selling these
credit monitoring services to consumers. 162 On the consumer front,
this profit can be as much as ten percent of the CRAs' operating
revenue. 163 These services lead to an increased awareness of credit
report inaccuracies by consumers. When consumers dispute these
inaccuracies, CRAs see a profit from the e-OSCAR dispute system.
While CRAs may argue that use of these products represents a step
towards addressing inaccuracies, this approach to ensuring accuracy is
not correct.
Most consumers "cannot avoid having a credit history."'6
Consumers cannot determine whether their information is collected by
CRAs.1 65 Nonetheless, CRAs want consumers to pay for the ability to
monitor their reports for inaccuracies. 166 Further, despite requests by
furnishers for a free dispute submission process, 6 7 CRAs profit when
158. Bennett, supra note 39, at 5. Freecreditreport.com is such a credit
monitoring product that Experian markets to consumers. See FREECREDITREPORT.
COM, supranote 126.
159. Bennett, supranote 39, at 5.
160. Aleksandra Todorova, Credit-Monitoring: A False Sense of Security,
SMART MONEY (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/
credit-monitoring-services-a-false-sense-of-security.
161. Bennett, supranote 39, at 5.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Wu, supra note 8, at 180.
165. Id.
166. See FREECREDITREPORT.COM, supra note 126.
167. DISPuTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 16.
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furnishers seek to correct inaccuracies through e-OSCAR. 168 CRAs
profit from furnishers addressing consumer disputes despite the fact
that furnishers voluntarily provide CRAs with consumer
information. 169 In effect, CRAs make money from information that is
voluntarily provided by furnishers by selling consumer credit
monitoring products and generating income through the dispute
process itself. The current system allows CRAs to exploit the same
parties that allow it to survive. CRAs will continue to thrive by
finding ways to profit at the expense of consumers and furnishers.

VI. A FRAMEWORK

OF INCENTIVES AND PUNISHMENTS

The current credit reporting system is flawed. In order to fix a
credit reporting system that continually fails consumers and
businesses, incentives must be implemented that will reward
furnishers for reporting accurate information about consumers to
CRAs. Commentators are split on how best to address the accuracy
issues plaguing the credit reporting industry. Proposed solutions

include (1) strengthening a consumer's private right of action against
CRAs,170 (2) passing liability from CRAs to furnishers, 17 1 (3)
clarifying the accuracy standards that CRAs must comply with, 172 (4)
addressing accuracy issues prior to the time a dispute is submitted, 173
and (5) reviving common law torts against furnishers. 174 These
arguments fail to adequately consider the voluntary nature of the
consumer credit reporting industry. A new framework is needed that
both rewards accuracy and punishes inaccuracy.

168. e-OscarCosts, supra note 148; see also Wu, supra note 8, at 184.
169. See DISPUTE PROCESS REPORT, supranote 29, at 34.

170. CASSADY & MIERzwINSKI, supra note 63, at 14.
171. Neil Vanderwoude, Comment, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Fairfor
Consumers, Fairfor CreditReporting Agencies, 39 Sw. L. Rev. 395, 409 (2009).
172. O'Brien, supra note 3, at 1218-20.
173.

De Armond, supra note 4, at 1100.

174. Id. at 1118 (calling for an application of the common law tort of
defamation to CRAs and furnishers).
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A. Streamline the Dispute Process:A Call to Strike § 1681s-2(a)(8)
Section 1681s-2(a)(8) allows consumers to dispute information
directly with the furnisher.' 7 5 Under current law consumers can
dispute information with either a CRA' 7 6 or a furnisher.1 7 7
Administrative agencies have the ability to enforce provisions of the
FCRA regardless of whether the consumer initiates the dispute with a
CRA or a furnisher.1 78 However, the only way to establish civil
liability is for the consumer to initiate the dispute with a CRA.179
Once a dispute is sent to a CRA, a consumer can sue the CRA for
either willfulso or negligent' 8 noncompliance with the FCRA. Civil
liability can attach to a furnisher if the consumer sent the original
dispute to the CRA, and the CRA in turn communicated the dispute to

the furnisher.18 2
On the surface, it makes sense for consumers to dispute inaccurate
information with the entity that is furnishing the information.
Information within a credit report originates with furnishers. The
furnisher houses the original information and has the ability to modify
the underlying records that are reported monthly to the CRAs.
However, the credit reporting industry is voluntary,1 83 meaning that
furnishers are under no obligation to report information to CRAs.

175. 15 U.S.C. §1681s-2(a)(8) (2003).
176. Id. § 1681i.
177. § 1681s-2(a)(8).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (2003).
179. See id. § 168 1s-2(c) (2003).
180. Id. § 1681n.
181. Id. § 1681o.
182. Id. § 1681s-2(b); see also Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp.
2d 776, 783 (W.D. Ky. 2003) ("[Section] 1681s-2, subsection (b), contains no
limitations on the availability of remedies. Based on this clear statutory difference,
the Court concludes § 1681s-2(b) does allow a consumer to bring a private cause of
action against a furnisher of credit information for either negligent, § 16810, or
willful, § 1681n, violations of the FCRA. Virtually all courts considering this issue
are in agreement.").
183. Interagency Guidelines Concerning the Accuracy and Integrity of
Information Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies, 12 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. E
(2010).
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Placing undue burdens on furnishers may prompt some furnishers,
especially smaller ones, to stop reporting information to CRAs.184
Further, not all inaccuracies are attributable to furnishers 8 5
"Many credit reporting inaccuracies are caused entirely by the
CRAs."' 86 These inaccuracies include "mixed" or "mismerged" files
where items on a credit report belonging to someone other than the
consumer are reflected on the consumer's credit report.1 8 7 A "mixed
file" can also result from identity theft-a problem not attributable to
furnishers.18 8 Furnishers should not be responsible for investigating all
errors on a consumer credit report, particularly those that are not
attributable to them.
Despite the fact that the information in the credit report originates
with fumishers, CRAs are better equipped to handle disputes. CRAs
are the "library" 89 : they house information and offer it to consumers
and business. If a piece of information is inaccurate, they alone have
the ability to alter or stop reporting it, meaning the ability to take it off
the shelves. Further, CRAs are in the business of selling information.
They have created complex automated systems for handling disputes,
allowing them to process dispute letters, often containing multiple
disputes, at about only $0.50 each.190 Their system of handling
disputes by outsourcing disputes all around the world'91 is complex.
Conversely, the activities of furnishers vary in size, nature,
complexity, and scope.192 Smaller furnishers are not in a position to
adequately investigate consumer disputes where any investigation
would prove unduly burdensome.1 93 Furnishers are not in the business
184. DISPuTE PROCESS REPORT, supra note 29, at 9. Some furnishers already
choose not to report information about certain consumers out of a concern that other
lenders will compete for the consumers. This is prevalent with elite and subprime
customers. Id.
185. See Bennett, supra note 39, at 7-12.
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id. ("One study found that 44% of consumer reporting complaints to the
FTC involved mismerged files.").
188. Id.
189. Kadet, supra note 12.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See 16 C.F.R. § 660.3 (2010).
193. See Procedures to Enhance the Accuracy and Integrity of Information
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of confirming the accuracy of information and are therefore not
equipped to do so. Further, as discussed above in Section V, CRAs
profit from the dispute process at the furnisher's expense. Because
CRAs profit from the process, they should bear the brunt of the
investigation.
Most importantly, consumers are unlikely to be aware that a
dispute filed directly with a furnisher does not implicate the civil
liability that a dispute filed with a CRA will. By filing a dispute with a
CRA, consumers preserve their ability to bring a suit against either the
furnisher or the CRA. However, when a consumer files a dispute with
a furnisher, they are effectively denying themselves relief. This
confusion places consumers in a perilous position. Consumers are
likely to dispute inaccurate information directly with the furnisher
because doing so is logical: information originates with the furnisher,
so the furnisher should be able to correct it. But, by disputing
information directly with a furnisher, consumers are actually doing
themselves a great disservice.
By striking § 1681s-2(a)(8) of the FCRA, consumers will have a
single location to dispute information; namely, the CRAs. Information
will flow in one direction-from the consumer to the CRA, and then
to the furnisher if necessary. Section 1681s-2(a)(8) complicates the
dispute process by allowing communication to flow in multiple
directions, from the CRA to the furnisher, or from the furnisher to the
CRA. Further, under § 1681s-2(a)(8), a single dispute can be initiated
with both the CRA and the furnisher. It is difficult to track a dispute or
attach liability when information is flowing in multiple directions. An
efficient, streamlined dispute process is needed.
If communication flows in a single direction, CRAs and furnishers
will be encouraged to work together to create a dispute resolution
process that accommodates their business needs while still ensuring
accuracy. This incentive will be driven by the potential "punishment"
of liability that attaches to disputes originating with the CRA. The
likely result will be a modification of the e-OSCAR application. The
program's capabilities will likely be expanded to include electronic
copies of relevant documents, allowing furnishers to more accurately
address disputes sent to them from CRAs.
Furnished to Consumer Reporting Agencies Under Section 312 of the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 31,485, 31,493 (July 1, 2009).
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Striking § 1681s-2(a)(8) will add accountability to the industry by
attaching civil liability to all disputes. It will also streamline the
dispute process. Attaching liability to the process will create
incentives for CRAs and furnishers to create an expedited dispute
process.
B. Promote Transparency:A Call to Amend § 1681j(a) (1) (A)
of the FCRA
With the advent of the FCRA, Congress understood that many
consumers are not familiar with the credit reporting industry.'9 4 The
intent of the FCRA is "to enable consumers to protect themselves
against arbitrary, erroneous, and malicious credit information."' 95
Section 1681j(a)(1)(A) of the FCRA requires CRAs to furnish a copy
of a consumer's credit report to the consumer "once during any 12month period upon request of the consumer." 96 If consumers are
unaware of the inaccuracies in the credit report they will not dispute
them. This puts consumers at risk of being denied, or paying more
than they should, for credit.' 9 7 When consumers are only given nocharge access to their credit reports once per year, they are not
provided adequate opportunity to protect themselves.
CRAs have the ability to monitor a consumer's credit report and
access it at any point in time. 98 These credit monitoring services have
"almost zero marginal cost to the [CRAs], yet they sell it for $150 a
year or more."199 The CRAs are deriving a profit from consumers who
wish to be informed of their credit score; 200 these consumers are, in
essence, victims of "credit extortion. "201 Congress should eliminate
the CRAs' ability to extort consumers by requiring CRAs to be more
194. See 115 CONG. REc. 2410 (1969) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("You
may not have heard of retail credit, but there is a good chance it has heard of you.").
195. Id.
196. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (2003).
197. CASSADY & MIERzwINsKI, supra note 63, at 6.
198. See FREECREDITREPORT.COM, supra note 126. Freecreditreport.com offers
consumers the ability to purchase a credit monitoring product sold by Experian,
which is one of the major CRAs.
199. Todorova, supra note 160.
200. See FREECREDITREPORT.COM, supra note 126.
201. Bennett, supra note 39, at 5.
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transparent. CRAs should be required to offer consumers real-time
access to their credit reports at no charge. By requiring that CRAs
provide consumers with free access to credit reports without
limitation, the accuracy and integrity of the credit reporting industry
will no longer be diluted through the use of "imposter sites."20 2
At the very least, CRAs should be required to give consumers free
credit reports at least once per quarter. Further, because consumers
may be unaware they can obtain free credit reports, CRAs should be
required to give notice to consumers at least once per year. This notice
should outline the process for obtaining a free copy of the consumer's
credit report. CRAs already possess the contact information for every
consumer for whom they have a credit report. While this mandate will
cause CRAs to incur cost, the benefit to the economy greatly
outweighs this. This move will prompt CRAs to provide real-time
service for free rather than comply with costly notice requirements.
Consumers will be able to more accurately keep track of their
accounts, reducing rates of identity theft. In addition, creditors will
develop a more accurate understanding of the consumer when the
overall accuracy of the credit reporting industry improves.
Section 1681j(a)(1)(A) should be amended to require that CRAs
offer real-time credit tracking services to consumers with credit
reports. Section 1681j(a)(1)(A) should also require CRAs to notify
consumers of the process for obtaining access to the free credit
monitoring service annually via mail or e-mail.

VII. CONCLUSION
The current credit reporting landscape is monolithic. CRAs are
fed a massive amount of free data which is then repackaged and sold.
Voluntary furnishers of this information are facing increasing liability
to ensure the accuracy and integrity of the information, and consumers

202. FTC FACTS, supra note 44. Freecreditreport.com is not authorized to fill
orders for the free annual credit report consumers are entitled to under the FCRA. Id.
at 1-2. The "government-sanctioned website" for consumers to receive free copies of
their credit reports is AnnualCreditReport.com. Id. at 1. However, this website does
not receive the $19 million in advertising that the "imposter site,"
FreeCreditReport.com, received in the third quarter of 2008. Stacey L. Bradford,
FreeCreditReport.com: Not So Free - Still, SMART MONEY (Jan. 23, 2009),
http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/rip-offs/freecreditreportcom-not-so-free-still.
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continue to cry for help with no avail-all while the cost of collecting,
storing, and analyzing credit-relevant data continues to decrease for
CRAs.2 0 3 CRAs are the primary beneficiaries of the credit reporting
industry, yet legislation and regulation fail to reflect this by placing
burdens on the parties being exploited by CRAs.
Striking § 1681s-2(a)(8) from the FCRA will streamline the
dispute process. It will also encourage CRAs and furnishers to work
together to create an expedited dispute resolution process. In addition,
amending §1681j(a)(1)(A) of the FCRA will create more informed
consumers. Consumers will know when their commercial identities
are not accurate and will have the opportunity to dispute the
inaccuracies. This framework will not only allow CRAs to remain
profitable and allow businesses to more accurately plan for risk, it will
also give consumers peace of mind knowing they are able to obtain
credit at a fair price.
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203. Willis, supra note 36, at 720-21.
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